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Cyber Bullet 2.zip


This is the second of my CSB articles. I had some great feedback from CSB #1 on Business Email Compromise (BEC) so I thought I would continue. For those who are new to CSB, the aim of these articles is to show that only a single security control can protect your business from the often significant impact of a cyber incident. If you think about this from an attackers perspective, they need their attacks to be easy! Many attackers are not advanced technical whizzes that are portrayed by many in the cyber security industry and media. Instead, the vast majority are criminal fraudsters who work in groups and use tools and scripts written by the few, more capable, technical experts. They hide in plain sight, often in jurisdictions where law enforcement located in the countries of their victims find it financially and operationally difficult to reach them and bring them to justice. This harsh reality is that which underpins the global Ransomware and cyber-crime crisis.




Cyber Bullet 2.zip



Both Ransomware and the previously described BEC incidents are by far the most common cyber incidents currently (Q2 2019). The rise of Ransomware over the last 10 years has been significant and many in government and business have found it difficult to prevent and contain. Organisations of all sizes and types have fallen foul to Ransomware and many have decided to pay the ransom in order to recover critical business data.


Because of the variation of network configuration and security environments (where they exist!) there is no single security control for the prevention and detection of Ransomware. However, there is a single preparative/reactive control that is close to a cyber silver bullet; that of isolated and structured network backups.


So, when it comes to ensuring business continuity from a Ransomware; or indeed any other type of attack affecting systems/data availability, ensuring an isolated optimised backup regime may well be your 'get out of jail' card if not your cyber silver bullet.


The laws of physics are immutable: When the amount of energy transferred to an object exceeds the strength of its molecular bonds, the result is inevitable. This is the world of kinetic strikes, the world of bombs and bullets. It is not, however, the world of cyberwarfare.


The process for developing, testing, manufacturing, and deploying the Mk 82 and similar munitions is well understood. But what of cyber weapons? Suppose a commander was told the effectiveness of a weapon depended entirely on a large constellation of variables, some predictable, many that are not, and some that are unknowable. This is where the Navy finds itself today when attempting to develop and deploy cyber weapons.


The variables to consider when fielding a cyber weapon could reach well into the thousands, if not higher. This assessment, of course, only contends with known variables. Accounting for the probability of unknown factors (such as network link volatility or system memory state) can take what was once considered a simple deterministic process to achieve an effect and turn it to a non-deterministic probability.


Worse still is when the vulnerability used to gain access to a target is discovered by the adversary. While signatures can possibly be modified, new vulnerabilities are finite and cannot be created. A show-of-force operation, or any operation that is, by design, meant to be discovered, will result in a capability that is no longer effective and loss of access to target systems. The best hope for retaining reproducible effects is to ensure that cyber-attacks are covert and nonattributable whenever possible and only executed overtly out of necessity.


Assuming the cyber weapon has remained undetected and unmitigated through its initial deployment, how can the Navy and Marine Corps enable its use by commanders at sea and on the ground? In most cases, offensive cyber operations cannot occur without access to target systems, and a weapon predeployed to targets in one geographic region will not help forces located in another.


In the realm of cyberwarfare access equals victory, and as with most victories, access typically is not achieved in a single hour or day; weeks, months, or even years of preparation are required. Furthermore, access to a given network that has taken months of preparation can be lost in an instant.8 New targets that require immediate action cannot not be engaged until appropriate preparation of the battlespace has occurred. This leaves most tactical and operational commanders with little recourse for delivering cyber effects to emergent targets without reaching back to strategic cyberwarfare assets.


As tantalizing as the concept of tactical cyberattacks is, there is a small and quickly vanishing number of use cases in which a previously unknown target could be engaged in this manner. Targets of opportunity in the cyberwarfare domain are few and far between.


Unlike the scientists and engineers who developed the Mk 82, cyber capability developers do not have years or decades of research to fall back on. They cannot rely on the immutable laws of nature and physics to ground their assumptions; the laws of cyberspace are being rewritten every hour of every day.


Given the complexities of cyberwarfare, what is a commander to do if he or she can see the potential for cyber enabled effects but is unsure how to deploy or integrate them? Addressing the following points will provide a realistic assessment of how and when cyber effects could be deployed:


Acknowledge complexity. Commanders must understand that the more complex an order, the more time and resources will be required for its execution. They must realize that, given the myriad variables involved, ordering a new cyber effect on a new target is one of the most complex orders that can be issued.


Prepare your battlespace. Seemingly simple requests may require weeks or longer of prep work. A single antiair battery can be disabled in seconds by a kinetic strike. A similar action could take months for a cyber effect, requiring cyberwarfare elements to penetrate multiple layers of networks and defenses to stage the effect when it is needed. For example, cyber commands that support tactical units must ensure their theaters of operations are prepared well in advance to support tactical-level cyberwarfare activity.


Know the stakes. Employing cyber effects almost always will have unintended consequences. Show-of-force activities are a surefire way to lose a capability. Furthermore, effects that quickly disable or destroy a target should be used sparingly as they will quickly be discovered and rendered inert. The more spectacular or frequently used the effect, the likelier the loss of that capability. Capabilities that generate deception or low-grade degradation effects are more likely to be enduring.


Ultimately, commanders must have the ability to deploy a variety of cyber capabilities if the Navy is to fight effectively in the 21st century. However, the notion that the Navy and Marine Corps can engineer, test, and field a cyber weapon the same way it does conventional weapons is a fallacy that the services should seek to end. Doing so will require a paradigm shift in the thinking of leaders, removing the concept of weapon deployment from cyberwarfare and replacing it with that of effects generation.


To start this particular side job, make your way to the Jinguji shop in Downtown and speak with Zane by the counter. The dialogue options that you select during your conversation will have no effect on the outcome of the mission.During the conversation, you'll be interrupted by a Cyberpyscho, who begins attacking the store. Putting the store into lockdown, Zane will cower behind the counter and will leave V to take care of the situation.With little room to work, fighting the cyberpyscho won't be easy, so you'll need to employee a number of tactics to make it through the fight. First things first, you'll want to be utilizing your quickhacks, should you have any available - we found overheating or short circuiting worked a treat.Using grenades and a weapon with a passive damage effect will also be greatly effective. Once you've dealt enough damage to the cyberpyscho, you'll MaxTac reinforcements will finally arrive and will help you finish him off.With the cyberpyscho defeated, follow the MaxTac agent to the nearby couch and give your statement. This is where the mission will end, however, should you wait and return in 2-days, you'll find that the Jinguji shop will have reopened and Zane will provide you a discount on his clothing.


  • Keys to writing a cyber security specialist job description. Zippia analyzed thousands of cyber security specialist job descriptions to identify key pieces of information you want to include. Using a machine learning data analysis, we determined the following key facts about cyber security specialist job descriptions: The average cyber security specialist job description intro is about 184 words

  • The responsibilities section contains an average of 13 bullets points

  • The requirements section contains an average of 10 bullets points


The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has the mission to provide a common baseline of security across the Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) and to help agencies manage their cyber risk. This common baseline is provided in part through the EINSTEIN system. EINSTEIN serves two key roles in FCEB cybersecurity. First, EINSTEIN detects and blocks cyberattacks from compromising federal agencies. Second, EINSTEIN provides CISA with the situational awareness to use threat information detected in one agency to protect the rest of the government and to help the private sector protect itself.


A useful analogy for understanding EINSTEIN is that of physical protections at a government facility. The first phase of EINSTEIN, known as EINSTEIN 1 (E1), is like a camera at the entrance to the facility that records cars entering and leaving and identifies unusual changes in the number of cars. EINSTEIN 2 (E2) adds the ability to detect suspicious cars based upon a watch list. E2 does not stop the cars, but it sets off an alarm. In sum, E1 and E2 detect potential cyberattacks before they can enter the facility. The latest phase of the program, known as EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (E3A), is akin to a guard post at the highway that leads to multiple government facilities. E3A uses classified information to look at the cars and compare them with a watch list. E3A then actively blocks prohibited cars from entering the facility. Using classified information allows E3A to detect and block many of the most significant cybersecurity threats. 041b061a72


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